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Kant’s Antinomy of Teleology: In Defense of a Traditional Interpretation 
Uniquely, Kant gives two formulations of an opposition in the Antinomy of Teleology, 
one between regulative, the other between constitutive principles. This has given rise to 
considerable dispute over which pair represents the real Antinomy, which, naturally, has 
consequences for interpreting its resolution. According to the “Traditional View”1, an 
apparent antinomy resides in the constitutive pair, and is resolved by noting the confusion 
of merely regulative maxims as constitutive principles. On the “New Orthodoxy”2, 
however, the regulative theses are themselves antinomial. The latter view owes in large 
part to perceived problems of squaring the Traditional View with the broader structure of 
the Dialectic of Teleology. Here, I argue in defense of the Traditional View: I first 
present the antinomy and its resolution, then respond to several objections to it rooted in 
perceived textual worries. Throughout, I emphasize hitherto neglected parallels with the 
Antinomy of Taste that shed light on the Antinomy of Teleology. 
 A dialectic of the power of judgment in its reflecting use, in general, consists in 
the opposition of judgments that make a claim to universality and necessity. However, as 
merely reflecting judgment, this is subjective, not objective, universality. That is, a 																																																								
1 Erich Adickes, Kant als Naturforscher, bd. 2 (Berlin, 1925), 473-4; Ernst Cassirer, 
Kants Leben und Lehre (Berlin, 1921), 369; August Stadler, Kants Teleologie und ihre 
erkenntnistheoretische Bedeutung (Berlin, 1874), 128. A more recent defense of this 
position is in Marcel Quarfood, Transcendental Idealism and the Organism (Stockholm, 
2004). 
2 John McFarland, Kant’s Concept of Teleology (Edinburgh, 1970), 118; Peter 
McLaughlin, Kant’s Critique of Teleology in Biological Explanation (Lewiston, 1990), 
134-6; Henry Allison, “Kant’s Antinomy of Teleological Judgment.” The Southern 
Journal of Philosophy, 30 Supplement (1991): 25-42; Eric Watkins, “The Antinomy of 
Teleological Judgment.” Kant Yearbook, 1 (2009): 197-221. 
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conflict, hence the appearance of an antinomy, obtains only to the extent that the 
statements lay claim to necessity and universality that bind the judgments of other 
subjects, but without laying claims about any objective determinations. So, in the case of 
aesthetic judgment, an antinomy arises with respect to two maxims, one of which claims 
that judgments of taste are founded on concepts (otherwise it would not be possible to 
argue in matters of taste), while the other denies it (otherwise claims of taste could be 
adjudicated by rational proofs, which they are not). So, Kant resolves the antinomy by 
exposing an equivocation in the sense of ‘Begriff’ in the two statements. The solution lies 
in treating the predicate of an aesthetic judgment, not as a determinate concept of the 
object, but as a concept that is “in itself indeterminable” (KU AA 5:340.17). Then, the 
thesis, that the judgment of taste is not based on concepts, can be taken as universally 
valid, insofar as the statement does not make an objective claim on the basis of a 
determinate concept, thereby does not admit a rational proof; and the antithesis, that the 
judgment of taste is based on concepts, can be treated as universally valid, since it is 
possible to argue about taste without making determinate objective claims. Thus, the 
resolution of the antinomy consists in exposing a confusion in the relation between the 
concept and the object that is judged.3 
 In its teleological use the power of judgment becomes antinomial in a similar 
manner. Its conflicting judgments pertain to its reflection on one kind of object, namely, 
Naturzwecke or organisms. In the absence of mechanical schematisms through which the 
generation of organisms can be explained in the same way as the motions of bodies, the 
																																																								
3 KU AA 5:337-41. This reading of the Antinomy of Taste agrees with: Henry Allison, 
Kant’s Theory of Taste: A Reading of the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment, (Cambridge, 
2001); Paul Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Taste, (Cambridge, 1997). 
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power of judgment proceeds under the presupposition of a purposiveness of nature, in 
accordance with which Naturzwecke would be formed. To direct its inquiries in such 
cases, the power of judgment relies on regulative maxims, which, while eschewing 
claims to objective validity, are able to serve the cognitive faculties in their investigation 
into empirical laws of organisms. These maxims are, indeed, necessary, for otherwise 
there would be no possibility of ascending to higher unities of empirical laws of nature. 
Without such maxims, in other words, cognition would come to a standstill upon 
encountering objects for which the understanding does not have concepts. Consequently, 
Kant writes that such maxims are needed to arrive at concepts, even if these are 
“Vernunftbegriffe”. Thus, a conflict arises between the maxims of the power of judgment 
once competing claims of the cognitive faculties become involved in the search for 
empirical laws. In particular, when each of two maxims of the reflecting power of 
judgment is grounded in separate cognitive faculties, a “natural dialectic” and an 
“unavoidable illusion” comes about (KU AA 5:386.2-9). It is this condition of the 
faculties that needs to be diagnosed so that we are not deceived. 
With this set up, Kant presents the antinomy of teleological judgment by 
contrasting the specification of nature with respect to its universal as opposed to its 
particular laws. For the application of the universal laws of matter and motion, the power 
of judgment relies wholly on objective principles given to it by the understanding. In the 
case of the particular laws of empirical nature, however, the determining power of 
judgment alone is insufficient, for the schematisms of the understanding do not offer 
grounds to decide between one or another set of particular empirical laws. The power of 
judgment, thus, requires maxims of reflection with which to orient its investigation into 
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the contingent unity of particular laws. For this task, each of the other two, higher 
faculties supplies it with a principle, the understanding in accordance with its categories, 
and reason in accordance with its demand for the unconditioned in the series of 
appearances for which the understanding is inadequate.4 Thus, a conflict results between 
the following maxims: “All generation of material things and their forms must be judged 
as possible in accordance with merely mechanical laws.”; and “Some products of 
material nature cannot be judged as possible according to merely mechanical laws 
(judging them requires an entirely different law of causality, namely that of final causes)” 
(KU AA 5:387.3-9). 
Each statement makes a claim with respect to the manner in which the generation 
of material things is to be judged. The thesis represents the understanding’s interest in 
cognition of nature, that all material objects be judged in accordance with the laws of 
mechanical nature. The antithesis, by contrast, represents reason’s interest in cognition of 
nature, inasmuch as certain appearances resist mechanistic explanation, thus demand a 
different kind of causality. The reconciliation of this apparent opposition is achieved by 
noting that these maxims are in fact merely subjectively valid for the reflecting use of the 
power of judgment, and not objectively valid for cognition. The resolution of the conflict 
between the maxims of the power of judgment in its teleological context, as in the 
aesthetic one, requires exposing a confusion, in this case that of confusing principles of 
the reflecting with ones of the determining power of judgment.  
																																																								
4 KU AA 5:386.29-34. 
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Indeed, as Kant points out, there is in fact no contradiction here at all.5 For the 
thesis does not assert that all material objects are possible only in accordance with 
mechanical laws, but just that “I should always reflect on them in accordance with the 
principle of the mere mechanism of nature"” (KU AA 5:387.31-33). Thus construed, the 
thesis does not conflict with the second maxim, which only requires that in some cases 
investigation should be guided by the principle of final causes. The use of the teleological 
maxim does not exclude the use of the mechanistic one, but rather presupposes it.6 For 
even Naturzwecke must first be judged as part of the system of nature, thus governed by 
the laws of mechanism, before teleological principles can be employed to investigate 
their special characteristics as organized beings. Furthermore, the employment of the 
teleological maxim does not rule out the possibility that even natural organized beings 
might have originated through purely mechanical processes. Rather, it only claims that it 
is not possible for us to judge organisms as such. It is a limitation of human reason that 
requires our dependence on appeal to final causes, but we should not thereby infer that 
organisms themselves are constituted through ends.7 Thus, the apparent conflict between 
the maxims is readily resolved, once certain confusions are cleared and the statements 
seen to be compatible. Indeed, Kant writes:  
All appearance of an antinomy between the maxims of that kind of explanation 
which is genuinely physical (mechanical) and that which is teleological 
(technical) therefore rests on confusing a fundamental principle of the reflecting 
with that of the determining power of judgment. (KU AA 5:389.20-27) 																																																								
5 “Was dagegen die zuerst vorgetragene Maxime einer reflectirenden Urtheilskraft 
betrifft, so enthält sie in der Tat gar keinen Widerspruch” (KU AA 5:387.25-26). 
6 KU AA 5:388.3-6. 
7 KU AA 5:388.13-19. 
		
6	
The appearance of an antinomy, thus, results from confusing Maximen for the 
following, constitutive principles: “All generation of material things is possible in 
accordance with merely mechanical laws”; and “Some generation of such things is not 
possible in accordance with merely mechanical laws” (KU AA 5:387.13-16). The 
constitutive principles represent a true contradiction, and an irreconcilable antinomy 
threatens. However, Kant writes, this would not be an antinomy of the power of 
judgment, but “a conflict in the legislation of reason” (KU AA 5:387.20-21). For, so 
formulated, the antinomy arises from the opposing claims of understanding and reason to 
objective knowledge, in the pursuit of which the power of judgment would operate in its 
determining function. Under such principles, the power of judgment would not need its 
maxims for reflection, since it would be given constitutive principles. Unfortunately 
though, reason is in no position to prove either of these principles, since it can have no a 
priori principle for determining the possibility of objects in accordance with empirical 
laws of nature.8 The a priori principles of reason and understanding have their legitimate 
use only with respect to the domain of moral action, and to the universal laws of material 
nature, respectively. But the generation of organisms requires specifying empirical laws 
of nature and, as such, is decidable neither by the moral law, nor by the laws of matter in 
motion alone. Thus, the antinomy cannot be resolved to show, for instance, that both 
statements are false (as in the mathematical antinomies), or that both can be true (as in 
the dynamical antinomies), or that one is valid from the sensible and the other from the 
intelligible standpoint (as in the antinomy of pure practical reason). 
																																																								
8 KU AA 5:387.22-24. 
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To sum up, Kant presents two ways in which the power of judgment might be led 
into conflict with itself. In the first place, a merely apparent opposition arises between 
two of its maxims. However, this illusion of conflict is dissolved once each maxim is 
understood in its proper sense, and the domain of application of each is made clear. Kant 
goes further, in fact, to claim that, not only is there no contradiction between the two 
maxims, but that each is needed for a proper investigation of nature. In the second place, 
a true contradiction arises when regulative maxims are treated as constitutive principles 
issued from the understanding and reason. Being a true contradiction due to a 
transgressive legislation of a priori principles, this conflict cannot be resolved, for it 
requires settling conclusively a question about particular empirical laws of nature. 
 I will now consider four objections that have led commentators to reject the 
foregoing interpretation in favor of the “New Orthodoxy” – that a genuine antinomy 
resides in the regulative maxims, the resolution of which is the task of §§71-78. 
 The first objection claims that the Traditional View sits in tension with Kant’s 
promise to provide an antinomy of the reflecting power of judgment, whereas the 
constitutive principles belong to determining judgment.9 This remark alone, however, 
does not tell us whether the antinomy should be located in the regulative pair or the 
constitutive pair of theses. In each case the thesis/antithesis pair is supplied to the power 
of judgment by the understanding and reason, respectively, hence is grounded in a priori 
principles of the cognitive faculties, as required for a dialectic. Moreover, as Kant 
explicitly states, the maxims of reflecting judgment do not in fact contradict.10 Thus, 
Kant’s opening remarks in the Dialectic are insufficient to establish whether an antinomy 																																																								
9 McLaughlin (1990, 138); Allison (1991, 30); Watkins (2009, 200). 
10 KU AA 5:387.25-26 
		
8	
holds between the regulative or the constitutive pair of theses. In fact, it is worth bearing 
in mind that a two-fold formulation of an antinomy is possible for the critique of taste as 
well, a circumstance of which Kant is aware. While Kant doesn’t explicitly provide two 
formulations in the Dialectic of Taste, he notes that a dialectic can only be a “dialectic of 
the critique of taste (not of taste itself)” (KU AA 5:337.14-15). Kant is concerned to note 
this fact before presenting the antinomy of taste, precisely because of a similar danger of 
confusing a principle of judging about taste with principles of taste itself. Such danger is 
more acute in the case of teleological judging, since the purposiveness of nature in 
dispute here is objective.  
The second objection asserts that, since reason cannot prove either of the two 
constitutive principles, the antinomy cannot hold between them, for, at least on the model 
of the antinomies of the first Critique, the theses must have formal proofs.11 However, it 
is equally unclear what the proofs of the regulative theses might be. One might be 
inclined to think that Kant’s deductions of the Newtonian laws in the Metaphysische 
Anfangsgründe provide the proof for the mechanist maxim. But that cannot be sufficient, 
for what is it at issue in the third Critiqueis the discovery of particular empirical laws of 
natural formations, rather than universal laws of moving bodies. What’s more, Kant is 
explicit that the impossibility of the generation of Naturzwecke through mere mechanism 
cannot be proven, thus making possible the constitutive theses.12 That is, Kant must think 
that there is some argument for the logical possibility that Naturzwecke are generated 
through mechanical processes. Finally, even the proofs of the theses and antitheses of the 
																																																								
11 Watkins (2009, 200) 
12 KU AA 5:388.22-23. 
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cosmological antinomies of the first Critiqueare only indirect.13 Thus, the demand of 
direct proofs is nowhere required, and indirect proofs are forthcoming for both the 
regulative and constitutive statements of the antinomy. The second objection provides 
equally little reason to favor one or the other interpretation of the antinomy. 
Third, it is objected that a Kantian antinomy is not a mere confusion, as the 
Traditional View would have it. Rather, it is a deep illusion stemming from the nature of 
the cognitive faculties.14 This objection incorrectly takes the antinomies of the first 
Critique as the model for all Kantian antinomies. As Hinske argues, Kant’s use of the 
figure of the antinomy develops over time, and has multiple meanings even in the first 
Critique.15 Setting aside the cosmological antinomies, and focusing on the specific 
context of the critique of the power of judgment, it is clear that not all antinomies stem 
from formal logical oppositions. In particular, the antinomy of the critique of taste 
amounts to pointing out an equivocation in two senses of ‘Begriff’, as noted above, thus 
is closer to the manner in which the antinomy of teleology is resolved, than are the 
antinomies of the first and second Critiques. Unlike the latter, the resolution of the 
antinomies of the third Critique requires uncovering a rhetorical fallacy, and a conflict 
among the cognitive faculties. This should hardly be surprising since these antinomies are 
drawn neither from the faculty of concepts, nor of inference, but from Urteilskraft.  
Finally, commentators worry that, on the Traditional View, §§71-78 appear to be 
superfluous. If Kant resolves the antinomy almost as soon as he presents it, why did he 
																																																								
13 As McLaughlin notes (1990, 129). 
14 McLaughlin (1990, 360); Allison (1991, 31) 
15 Norbert Hinske, “Kants Begriff der Antinomie und die Etappen seiner Ausarbeitung”, 
Kant Studien, 56 (1965): 485-96. 
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bother to write the remaining sections of the Dialectic of Teleology?16 But the subsequent 
sections remain crucial, though not, strictly speaking, for the resolution of the antinomy. 
For Kant still owes his readers a diagnosis of why we are led to confuse regulative 
maxims for constitutive principles. Kant begins this diagnosis by exposing as inadequate, 
in §§72-73, four dogmatic approaches – the Epicurean, the Spinozist, the hylomorphist, 
and the theistic – for resolving the tension between mechanical and teleological principles 
of judging nature. §§74-75 argue further for the impossibility of a dogmatic judgment of 
the laws of generation of organized beings. This diagnosis not trivial, for it is rooted in a 
central Kantian insight that,  
if things are subsumed under a concept that is merely problematic, the synthetic 
predicates of such a concept... must yield the same sort of (problematic) 
judgments of the object, whether they are affirmative or negative, since one does 
not know whether one is judging about something or nothing. (KU AA 5: 397.7-
13).  
Since the maxims of reflecting judgment are never entitled to make constitutive claims 
about objects, one can never make synthetic existence claims about the final causes of 
Naturzwecke without falling into an antinomial confusion of taking regulative principles 
for constitutive ones. Thus, Kant famously declares the impossibility of a Newton, who 
could explain according to the laws of nature the generation of a blade of grass.17 Then, 
in the vastly influential §§76-77, Kant locates the impossibility of a dogmatic 
reconciliation of mechanism and teleology, with respect to the discovery of empirical 
laws of nature, in a profound chasm between the nature of our discursive intellect and 																																																								
16 McFarland (1970, 121); Watkins (2009, 200) 
17 KU AA 5:400.16-20. 
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that of an intuitive intellect. This discussion gets to the deep source in the nature of the 
cognitive faculties of the confusion between regulative and constitutive principles of 
judging, such that the dialectic of mechanism and teleology appears natural and 
avoidable, thus requiring a transcendental critique. §78, finally, cannot strictly be 
considered part of the treatment of the antinomy, for it presses beyond a diagnosis of the 
confusion of regulative and constitutive principles, to affirm that mechanism and 
teleology are not only compatible, but are in fact unifiable, albeit in a transcendent idea 
of the supersensible.18 Once again, it is instructive to see the parallel in the conclusion of 
the Dialectic of Taste, where Kant affirms the indeteminate idea of the supersensible as 
of a “substrate of nature” as well as of a “principle of the subjective purposiveness of 
nature for our cognitive faculties” (KU AA 5:346.16-18).  
The Traditional View, I submit, is the more natural way to read the Antinomy of 
Teleology, as most of its detractors concede. The reason for the emergence of the “New 
Orthodoxy”, I suspect has to do with the apparent textual discord with the rest of the 
Dialectic. In this paper, I hope to have cleared some of that appearance of discord, and 
thus contributed to restoring the more straightforward meaning of Kant’s text.  
																																																								
18 KU AA 5:414.12-15. 
